In the News 'merica And Her Guns

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
The Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States​

'Merica and Her Guns
Preface
In light of my new beginning here on Wynncraft, and to confer on this community some moral standard, I've decided to write this post in which I contend that 1. the Second Amendment consists of a natural right to self-defense, 2. this right is natural or otherwise fundamental and must be treated like all other natural rights, and 3. the right of the people to keep and bear arms must not only not be infringed by law, but by nature.

If you are not interested in the minutiae of constitutional law, then skip to the "Fundamental Rights" or "The Fraying of Freedom" chapters of this post. Barring "The Text and Context of the Second Amendment[,]" I made this post digestible to any reader. There is no need to comment that this post is "long"—that's beyond obvious. I spent a substantial amount of time writing this post; if anyone is interested in what I have to say, or is interested in hearing an opposing or perhaps a concurring argument, then please continue to read.

Introduction
The Second Amendment was ratified on December 15, 1791. For about two centuries, the federal government and most state governments did not impose any unreasonable regulations on the ownership of arms; but in recent years, debate has ensued over a variety of regulations, which has led to a re-examination of the text and context of the Second Amendment. Specifically, the scope of the right to keep and bear arms—the question is, whose right is it? And what does this right entail? Arguments are usually made based on one's association with a particular interpretive philosophy. In this post, I do not only argue on those grounds, but I argue based on the semantics of the text itself and the natural justification for the right that the Second Amendment consists of. In sum, I conclude that the Second Amendment consists of the right to self-defense, the right to self-defense is a natural right, and any laws that infringe on this legal and natural right are unjustified.

The Text and Context of the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative clause. Together, they read: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State" and "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed[,]" respectively. The relationship between them has led to two opposing conclusions about the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee, which is the right "to keep and bear Arms[.]" One conclusion says that the prefatory clause limits the scope of the operative clause, while the other says that it does not. The threshold question concerns whether a "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State" limits the scope of "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms[.]"

Before 2008, the Supreme Court had largely refused to answer that question, but in District of Columbia, et al. v. Dick Anthony Heller ("Heller") the Supreme Court ruled that the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment does not limit the scope of its operative clause, which means that the right to keep and bear arms is not limited to "A well regulated Militia," nor is it limited to "the security of a free State[.]" Furthermore, the Court ruled that for whatever reason or reasons the Amendment was ratified, they, too, are irrelevant in the determination of its scope. In other words, the right to keep and bear arms is unlimited insofar as it is not limited to the reason or reasons the Amendment was ratified. Therefore, "the people" is encompassed by each citizen of the United States rather than those who are part of "A well regulated Militia," which means that the Second Amendment, according to Heller, guarantees each citizen the right to keep and bear arms.

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Semantics dictate that "A well regulated Militia" is equivalent to the militia of the United States because the subject, "a free State," does not refer to the United States specifically, but any "State" generally. Therefore, depending on how one defines the militia of the United States ("the militia"), the second model of interpretation that was adopted by the Court's minority in Heller—which says that the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment limits the scope of its operative clause—branches into an additional two sub-models of interpretation. For example, if "the militia" is defined pursuant to its twentieth or twenty-first century definition, then it is defined as the militia of the federal government of the United States; if "the militia" is defined pursuant to the definition of militia circa the Amendment's ratification in 1791, then it is defined as "every free able-bodied white male citizen" between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. See the Militia Act of 1792. Because of the ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth amendments, the latter definition no longer applies to every free able-bodied white male citizen alone, but rather every citizen.

Therefore, the former sub-model of interpretation must guarantee each citizen who is part of the militia of the federal government the right "to keep and bear Arms," while the latter sub-model must guarantee each citizen the right "to keep and bear Arms," notwithstanding the fact that the Amendment's guarantee under either sub-model is limited to "the security of a free State." In a 5-to-4 decision, although the Court ruled in favor of the first model of interpretation, the Court's minority ruled in favor of both the second model and first sub-model of interpretation, which would have limited the scope of the Second Amendment plausibly to the extent that only the militia of the federal government may exercise the right to keep and bear arms.

The reason the Court's minority adopted the second sub-model of interpretation was because of their interpretive philosophy, which says that law—including the Constitution—is not bound to the time at which its text was written. Conversely, the Court's majority in Heller was guided by the principle that the Constitution was written to be understood by the citizens of the United States at the time its text was written, which varies depending on when it was written. See the Supreme Court's majority ruling in United States v. Sprague, et al.. For this reason, in interpreting the Second Amendment, "Arms" is defined as "armaments," rather than the anatomical limb; similarly, "Militia" is defined in accordance with its definition circa the Amendment's ratification in 1791, albeit irrelevant in the Court's majority ruling.

In 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Otis McDonald, et al. v. City of Chicago, Illinois, et al. ("McDonald") and ruled that the Second Amendment applies not only to the federal government, but every state government, too. See selective incorporation.

In conclusion, and in accordance with the established precedents in Heller and McDonald, the Second Amendment guarantees each citizen of the United States the right "to keep and bear Arms," barring some long-established precedents, among which includes prohibition on the sale of arms to the mentally ill. See the Supreme Court's majority ruling in Heller. Although the Court did not establish the appropriate standard of review for the Second Amendment, I contend that the Second Amendment consists of a "fundamental right"—the right to defend oneself—and, for this reason, any laws respecting it must pass strict scrutiny. See strict scrutiny.

Fundamental Rights
The reason or reasons the Second Amendment was ratified were rendered irrelevant in Heller because the Second Amendment consists of the right to defend oneself, which is not limited to a finite number of applications. Some such applications influenced the framers of the Second Amendment, which is why the prefatory clause exists—to preface a reason for ratification. However, there is the right and not a right to defend oneself, which means that the Second Amendment consists of a fundamental right that is and ought to be largely unlimited.

The nature of the right to defend oneself—that is, whether it is or is not a fundamental right—is most clearly illustrated by its history. The text of the Second Amendment suggests that there was a pre-existing right to defend oneself before its ratification in 1791, which manifests in the preceding laws of the Colonies before the United States declared independence, as well as the preceding laws of Europe. For example, in 1328, King Edward III enacted the Statute of Northampton, which instructed individuals to "bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day[.]" See the Statute of Northampton. In 1686, an individual named Sir John Knight was charged in violation of the statute for carrying a weapon in public, but was subsequently acquitted. See Sir John Knight. The statute recognized the right to carry a weapon in public, presumably because there was, in the minds of the jury that acquitted him, a fundamental right to self-defense. In the run of history, the right to defend oneself appears throughout different societies across both time and space, which suggests that it is natural—a natural or otherwise fundamental right. Why does history suggest that this right is natural? The answer lends itself to the philosophy of John Locke among other Enlightenment philosophers.

John Locke published An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1689, in which he argues that natural law exists and that, by extension, natural rights exist. His conclusions are based on the notion of truth; that is, observable truth; for example, "[w]here there is no property, there is no injustice." See An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The reason this example is true is because of the relationship between the definitions of the relevant terms; if there is no property (i.e., the right to anything), then injustice (i.e., the violation of that right) must not exist. Similarly, John Locke says that "[n]o government allows absolute liberty" because government must, by definition, place a limitation on liberty. The same principle may be applied to the right to self-defense. Because men are by nature free and equal, they must be able to defend their nature; that is, their property.

The Fraying of Freedom
What does it mean to be free and equal? The terms "free" and "equal" carry with them a variety of meanings and interpretations, but before I clarify them, it would be more profitable to consider the conditions in which they exist rather than immediately define them.

The state of being free and equal is referred to as "freedom" and "equality," which both comprise the nature of man—but how? How does freedom and equality and the rights derived from them comprise the nature of man? First, one must answer, who is "man"? "Man" refers to all human beings, while "men" refers to a subset of human beings, or human beings generally, unless preceded by "all." Of course, who man is differs from what his nature is, but his nature is entirely predicated on who he is. For example, a man becomes independent from other men upon conception, which confers onto him autonomy; therefore, man is autonomous; autonomy predicates the nature of man and his natural rights because man is autonomous. Freedom and equality do not precede the existence of man, nor are they man, but they are natural to him because they are based on who he is.

Of course, the question has still not been answered: how does freedom and equality and the rights derived from them comprise the nature of man? Based on who man is, and with respect to equality, because men are independent from one another, they must be equal to one another. Equality, unlike healthcare or affordable housing, is not conferred onto man by himself, but by his very existence (i.e., autonomy). Sometimes equality, as I have just defined it, is confused with equality of conditions; man is not equal as it applies to his genetic endowment or inheritance, among other conditions, nor should he be. The capabilities of man are unequal and confined to his respective conditions, but how he acts based on those conditions should be subject to an equal level of scrutiny; because men are equal to one another, they are equally responsible for the acts that they commit. Like equality, freedom comprises the nature of man because men are by nature free to act. All men are independent from other men, which means that they are not by nature subordinate to others; therefore, they must be free to act insofar as their acts do not interfere with the rights of others. In other words, one cannot deny another's freedom because they are equally free; and if freedom is denied, then the denier should be subject to the denial of his own freedom.

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Because autonomy and its derivations apply to both an individual and a collective, two types of freedom exist: individual freedom and collective freedom. See The Constitution of Liberty. Collective freedom is the freedom of a collective, or a people, to act freely, which manifests in principles of democracy. However, a democracy may elect to strip its men of individual freedom. Therefore, a free people is not necessarily a people of free men, and because the security of a free people rests on the freedom of men to secure it, I am only concerned with individual freedom. Although it is true that to be free as an individual may entail the freedom to starve, and although to be a slave may entail relative comfort, if a slave is not free to secure his freedom, then he is neither free nor equal, but subordinate to his government.

Men require government in order to secure their freedom and equality, but only insofar as it secures their nature and natural rights; government must not create rights, but rather secure them. Of course, in order for security to exist, the ability to deny one's freedom and equality must be conferred on government because such denial cannot be altogether avoided. But if a government no longer exercises its power solely for the security of man's natural rights, and because the government derives its power from its people, then it is the right of its people to defend themselves from the denial of their freedom or equality. See the Declaration of Independence of the United States. The American Revolution is a prime example of men exercising their right to defend themselves from the denial of their rights by their government; the great achievement of the American Revolution was to issue "that inestimable state of freedom which alone can ensure to man the enjoyment of his equal rights." See Thomas Jefferson to the Republicans of Georgetown.

Offensive force, or the denial of one's freedom or equality by an individual or a collective, is incompatible with the nature of man and his natural rights. Defensive force, or the response to the denial of one's freedom or equality, is not only compatible with natural rights, but is fulfilled by them. The right to keep and bear arms, or by extension the right to self-defense, is derived from the nature of man. An offensive force may be exercised by an individual or a collective, but in either case, individuals have a natural right to defend themselves from any such incursion.

Conclusion
Because individual men are naturally free and equal, because they are not by nature subordinate to others, because they are naturally autonomous and independent from others, they have a right to self-defense. That is, the right to defend themselves from the denial of their nature or of their natural rights by any individual or collective. Men must by nature be free to act as equals, and such nature presupposes that they have a natural right to defend it. The Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States consists of the right to self-defense, or the right to keep and bear arms, which is not only required by law, but is required by the nature of man himself. The security of a free people rests on the freedom of men to secure it; for the future security of the United States, and for the future security of all mankind, the right to keep and bear arms must not be abridged.

Sincerely,

Blazerod27

References
See the Militia Act of 1792: constitution.org/mil/mil_act_1792.htm.
See the Supreme Court's majority ruling in United States v. Sprague, et al.: caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/282/716.html.
See selective incorporation: legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Incorporation+Doctrine.
See the Supreme Court's majority ruling in Heller: supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf.
See strict scrutiny: law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny.
See the Statute of Northampton: press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs1.html.
See Sir John Knight: engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=clevstlrev.
See An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book4.pdf.
See The Constitution of Liberty: Print; otherwise, archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.553409/page/n5.
See the Declaration of Independence of the United States: archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript.
See Thomas Jefferson to the Republicans of Georgetown: founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-01-02-0021.

 

What about assault rifels tho

 

I am confused as to why this was posted on the Wynncraft Forums of all places but I'm certain you'll get your civics doctorate in no time

 

Is this your college finals essay or something

 

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&sou...FjAAegQIBRAB&usg=AOvVaw3eqSvC_o7pCP8VOczdLwjD
fun read if your into milita units bro

 

P sure they got banned